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IN TilE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
15400

GEI-IE H. WADMAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLA:<T

STATEHENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant was charged

by

Information with

the crime of Forcible Sexual Abuse, a Third Degree Felony,
under Title 76-5-404, Utah Code Annotated.

The appellant

was found guilty of a Class A llisdemeanor.

From said

conviction, the appeallant appeals.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Honorable J.
presiding without a jury.

The Judge, on his

01m

Du~fy

Palmer,

motion,

after expressing considerable difficulty with the case
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(Tr. 224-225), reduced the matter to a Class A,,. d

·•l.S el'\eanor,
and placed the appellant on probation with no jail and no

fine.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant requests that the verdict be set
aside and that the District Court be ordered to dismiss
the charge.

In the alternative, the appellant requests

a new trial on the reduced charge.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant separated from his wife, Sandra
Wadman, on December 30, l97G.

During the week of January i

to January 7, the appellant's wife filed for divorce and
had this criminal charge brought against the appellant,
alleging that the appellant sexually abused her daughter
(appellant's step-daughter) on three separate occasions.
The appellant denied at trial having ever sexually abus~
the child

(Tr. 190).
In an attempt to defend himself, the appellant

filed a 11otion for Bill of Particulars (Rec. p. 10), reque;·
that the State supply the appellant with the date, aporoxi·:
time, and location where each alleqed incident took place.
The State replied with, a Bill of Particulars (Rec. P· 12),
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alleging that the incidents took place on:

November 29, 1976,

at aporoximately 6:00 to 7:00p.m. in a car; December 12, 1976,
at approximately 8:30 p.m. at the appellant's home; and on
December 30, 1976, at approximately 8:00p.m. at the appellant's
home.

The appellant subsequently filed a Notice of Alibi

(Rec. p. 16), covering the alleged incidents on November 29,
1976 and December 30, 1976.

Upon receipt of the Notice of

Alibi, the State amended its Bill of Particulars relatinq
to November 29, 1976, a11d changed it to November 28, 1976.
Evidence during the course of the trial oroved conclusively
that nothing improper happened on November 28, as will be
discussed in Argument.
permitted to waver

Based on this proof, the State was

from the 28th of November and to proceed

without tying down a date.

The appellant objected and

moved for either a mistrial or a oontinuance in order to
prepare for a different date.

This 11otion was denied

(Tr. p. 63).
The only evidence against the appellant

1~as

the

testimony of his former wife and his seven-year-old stepdaughter, and Judge Palmer frankly admitted he was not
persuaded by the testimony of the appellant's ex-wife.
There was a great deal of conff:Lcting testimony bet1~een
the mother and daughter, and i)r. Beraman testified that
the daughter's version of what happened with reference to
penetration was impossible (Tr. pp. 76-77) ·
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ARGUHEl~T

POINT I

THE TRI.'\L COURT PERMIT'rED TilE STATE TO PREc;ENT !WJDENCE OF
A CRII1E AS BEING COI1MITTED ON AN UHSPECIFTED DAY OTHER THA"
AS ALLEGED IN THE BILL OF PARTICULAR.S, AND IN DOINr:; SO
"
'
DENIED THE APPELLANT HIS RIGHT TO PURSUE I! IS ALIBI.
The State alleged in its original Bill of Particulars that the appellant sexually abused his
on three occasions, to-wit:

stec-da~M~,

November 29, 1976; Decemberl2,

1976; and December 30, 1976.

A Notice of Alibi was filed

as to November 29, 1976 and December 30, 1976, and upon
receipt of said alibi, the State amended its Bill of
Particulars from November 29, 1976 to November 28, 1976.
The appellant did not file a new Notice of Alibi as to
November 28, 1976, electing to prove that nothing criminal
happened on November 28, 1976, through the State's own
\~itnesses.

Initially at trial, the State's Witness, Sandra
l'iadman, contended that the incident took place on Noveriller 2·
1976, but the evidence and exhibits brought out durinq
Sandra Wadman's testimony (Tr. pp. 31, 53-60) showed that
nothing could have h appene d on Novem b er 2 8 .

the Court
\·"'en
vu

continued to permit evidence alleged to have taken place ~
November 28, 1976, the appellant moved for a mistrial and
· t t'
preparation
in the alternative, a continuance to perm1
ne
.
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of his defense for a different day (Tr. pp. 61-63).

The

Court denied the Motions and the appellant was required
to continue with the trial (Tr. p. 63).
In State vs. Nelson,

52

Utah 617, 176 Pac 860

(1918), the defendant had been char0ed with an act oF Carnal
Knowledge on Jply 13, 1917.

Defendant had had a preliminary

hearing based pn the July 13th incident.

At trial, the

State relied upon evidence of carnal knowledge on July 15,
1917.

In reve~sing the decision of the trial C?urt, it

was held as follows, at page 864:
"We are clearly of the opinion in this
case that the court erred in overruling
defendant's objection to the testimony
offered by the state to prove a different
transaction from the one for which the
defendant had been given a pre~iminary
examination.
It follows as a necessary
corollary from this conclusion that the
court erred in instructing the jury t?
the eftect that defendant might be
convicted for such transaction."
This Court has further held that to permit the
State to waver

from a specified date of an offense is,

in effect, to deny the defendant defense of alibi. State
vs. Waid,

92

Utah

297, 62 P 2d 647 (1937).

·In United States vs~ Armco Steel Corp.,

255

F. Supp 841 (1966), the District Court of California
discussed the nature of a Bill of Particulars and held
as follows, at page 846:
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"[2]
A bill of particulars oncr3 obtained
concludes the right of all of the parties
that.are affected by it. And he who has
furn1shed the bill of particulars under
1t must be confined to the particulars he
has.specified as closely and effectively
~s 1f they constituted essential allegations
1n a special declaration."
The Utah Supreme Court also went into the nature
of a Bill of Particulars in State vs. Spencer, 101 Utah 274,
117 P 2d 455

(1941), as follows; at page 458:

"The bill of particulars is a pleading
on the part of the state which limits
or circumscribes the area or field, the
transaction, as to which the state may
offer evidence.
It does not follow
that the state may offer evidence of
any matters set out in the bill of
particulars. Only those matters in
the bill of particulars which come
within the charge stated in the information, is open to investigation and
evidence. The bill of particulars
thus limits the field of inquiry
under the charge laid in the information, but cannot extend or expand
the field beyond the elements
constituting the crime charged."
Since the appellant in this case planned to, a~
in fact did use, the State's Witness to prove nothing
happened on November 28, 1976, and in effect proved his
alibi for·that day, the State should not have been allowed
to bring out evidence of some other, unspecified day· This
principle has been supported by this Court in State vs.
cooper,

114

Utah

531 , 201

P 2d 764 at 769, where it

reaffirmed State vs. Waid, supra, as follows:
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"[9]
Tl1e lssue
'
of time may be very
important where defendant's defense
lS alibi.
See state v. Waid,
92 Utah 297, 67 P 2d 647."

Based on the nature of the State's case and the
weaknesses in it as discussed in Point II, the Court's
consideration of the State's evl'd ence concerning the
alleged incident of November 28, 1976, was extremely
prejudiced and denied the appellant his right to prepare
and present an alibi for whenever the incident was alleged
to have taken place.

POINT II
THE STATE'S EVIDENCE WAS TOO UNRELIABLE AND INCOMPETENT TO
JUSTIFY THE VERDICT.
The State called four witnesses to prove its case,
and only two of those vlitnesses testified as to matters
an incriminating nature, to-wit, Sandra
appellant's former wife, and Lisa

l~adman

\~adman,

o~

Painter, the

the appellant's

step-daughter.
Sandra Wadman Painter testified that she in fact
watched

t~e

appellant fondle her dauqhter on two occasions.

The first occasion was the incident in November, 1976, in
~~1ich

she was unable, during trial, to determine the date.

On that occasion, however, she testified that she was driving
the family car and the appellant was in the back seat with
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Lisa.

She said that she adjusted the rear view mirror an.1

watched the appellant put his hand down Lisa's pants
(Tr. pp. 11-15).

She claims this happened while she was

driving from Ogden to Syracuse (Tr. p. 15).

San1r~

acknowledged that she never said anythin<J to the appellant
(Tr. p. 16).
Hrs. Painter also testified that on November 12,
1976 1 the appellant came home from 1vork and went into thG
bathroom where Lisa and her sister were taking a b'l.th, and
that she watched through a crack in the bathroom door while
the appellant rubbed Lisa's genitals at a time when
was standing in the tub

(Tr. pp. 16-21).

But again,

Lis~

s~

acknowledged that she did not discuss this incident with
Gene or with anyone else (Tr. 21).

It seems rather diffi-

cult to believe that the mother of a seven-year-old dauqhte:
would stand idly by and watch her daughter being molested
and say or do nothing about it.

In reveiwinq Sandra's

testimony as a whole 1 it is obvious that she and the appellr
argued considerably, and for her not to even brinq uo the
subject during an argument is unbelievable.
must be then asked

1

Why didn't she?

The question

Of course, the appella;:

answer is that these incidents never happened.
The appellant does contend that Sandra's rea~n
for

50

testifying was out of vindictiveness in connecti~

with their divorce.

In that respect, we draw the Court's
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attention to Defendant's Exhibit 1 which was a note to the
appellant written either the day or the day before she
filed the criminal Complaint (Tr. p. 36).

That note read

as follows:
'.'If you know what's good for you,
you Wlll get the hell out of here.
I
have filed for divorce so you can expect
papers anytime. You already have your
clothes packed so it won't take you lonq.
You better expect a sad ending, you will
never be forgiven for what you have done.
I will burn you if it's the last thing I
do.
For someone who bitches because the
kids make a mess, you sure are one to talk.
If it's only you living here, you sure keep
a messy house. You can't even clean up
water off the floor when the ~achine floods
over. Why can't you do your own dirty
dishes or even make your bed once in
awhile. Uow does it feel being single
again? Are your meals any good?"
It seems rather ironic that Sandra would complain
about the things she complained about and did not mention
Lisa.

\ve draw the Court's attention to the sentence that

states: "I will burn you if it's the last thing I do."
Sandra's

testimony should be reviewed in its

entirety in order to get the feel of her attitude, particularly in light of Judge Palmer's statement at the time
of sentencing when he said, "I am not persuaded by your wife .••
I have to be frank."

(Tr. p. 224).

The testimony of Lisa differed with that of her
mother in many respects.

She testified that the incident
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in the car happened on the way from Syracuse to Ogden
(Tr. p. 98), the opposite direction testified to by her
mother.
knees

She also said Gene took her pants down to her

(Tr. p. 110) , whereas her mother said Gene put his

hand down inside her pants.

Lisa also said that the inci-

dent in the car took place while she was sittinq next to
Gene

(Tr. p. 97), when Sandra said that Lisa was sitting

on his lap when it happened.

It should be noted, however,

that, after going to lunch with her mother during the noon
recess, Lisa changed her testimony so that it was in agreement with her mother's

(Tr. 104-105).

Lisa also testified that the incident in the
took place while she was sitting in the tub (Tr. p.l

bathroom

whereas her mother testified that Lisa was standing (Tr.

p.:

Lisa also testified that the appellant insert~hu
finger into her "pee-pee" about an inch and a quarter to
two inches

(Tr. p. 116).

This was absolutely contradicted

by Dr. Bergman when he testified that Lisa's hymen was
still intact (Tr. p. 73), and that a penetration of only
one-half to one centimeter would be all that was necessa0
to come in contact with the hymen.
As to the alleged incident on December 30, 1976,
the appellant contends that his alibi for that date as
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confirmed by Terry Smith (Tr. pp. 141-145) and Cindy Smith
(Tr. pp. 151-153) was very strong, and the State did not
overcome its burden of disproving beyond a reasonable
doubt.

State vs. Wilson,

Ut 2d

• 565 p 2d 66 (1977).

CONCLUSION
Based upon the appellant's inability to present
an alibi, due to the State's wavering from the Bill of
Particulars, and the basic unraliability of the State's
witnesses, the appellant respectfully requests this Court
to order the charge against him dismissed, and in the
alternative, that he be granted a new trial.

Respectfully submitted by the Attorney for the
Appellant,

304
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